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The Internet of things (IoT) is a system that utilizes 
the Internet to facilitate communication between 
sensors and devices. Given the ubiquitous nature of 
IoT devices, it is seemingly inevitable that IoT would 
be used as a conduit to transform healthcare. One 
such medical IoT (mIoT) device that is revolutionizing 
healthcare is the medical implant device. These mIoT 
implant devices which control insulin pumps, 
cardioverter defibrillators and bone growth 
stimulators have redefined the way patient data is 
accessed, and healthcare is delivered. These implant 
devices are a double-edged sword. While they allow 
for the effective and efficient noninvasive treatment of 
patients, this external communication makes the 
medical implants vulnerable to cyberattacks 
synonymous with IoT devices. As a result, privacy and 
security vulnerabilities have surfaced as pronounced 
challenges for mIoT devices. This work summarizes 
and synthesizes the inherent vulnerabilities associated 
with mIoT devices and the implications regarding 
patient safety.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Internet of things (IoT) is loosely defined as the 
communication between interconnected sensors and 
devices designed to utilize the internet for the 
collection, analyzation, and exchange of data. Keeping 
with the current trajectory, it is inevitable that IoT will 
give us the ability to collect and analyze data related 
to nearly every facet of our lives [1].  IoT is one of the 
driving factors that is fueling a new era of medical 
diagnosis and intervention [2, 3]. One such IoT device 
that is revolutionizing healthcare is the medical 
implant device. For instance, these devices control 
insulin pumps that allow for the administration of 
medication, cardioverter defibrillators that treat 
patients who show signs of cardiac arrest, and 
implantable bone growth stimulators [4-6]. Leading 
factors driving the medical implant market include the 
aging population, technological advances, increased 
knowledge of medical implant technology, and an 
increase in degeneration medical conditions [6]. 
Responses to a recent trade journal survey show 
cardiovascular and orthopedic medical implant 
devices are believed to account for more than half of 
the medical implant devices projected to make the 
most impact in fighting disease and improving patient 
care [6]. While medical Internet of Things (mIoT) 
devices such as medical implants have the propensity 
to advance healthcare, they also present unparalleled 
security challenges [7]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Generic Medical Implant Device 
Threat Model 
 
Implant devices are a double-edged sword. 
Medical implants allow for the transmission of 
medical data to physicians and medical facilities. 





These devices allow doctors to perform advance 
medical procedures, such as modifying the implant 
device without invasive surgical procedures. They also 
allow for the near real time transmission of the 
patient’s physiological data in treatment centers such 
as the ICU as well as remotely. Although the benefits 
these devices yield to patients are numerous, they also 
expose patients to cyberattacks [8]. It is the 
communication with systems outside of the patient’s 
body that make medical implants vulnerable to 
potential attacks [9]. While cyberattacks are common 
and seemingly expected in network-connected 
devices, their results, when applied to medical 
implants, could be life-threatening and lead to a loss 
of privacy [10]. As shown in Figure 1, a hacker can 
attack the implantable medical device or the wireless 
channel between the patient and medical personnel. 
Hacking medical devices is not uncommon and has 
been going on for over a decade. Reasons for hacking 
a medical device include hacktivism, financial motives 
such as extortion, and political [11, 12]. In 2018, NHS 
systems, a pacemaker manufacturer, was breached by 
a ransomware attack designed with the intention to 
extort money from the company [13]. While there are 
no published cases of physical harm or loss of privacy 
to medical implant device patients, the potentially fatal 
harm that could result from a cyberattack is cause 
enough for concern. 
While a device’s security requirements should 
reflect the risk associated with the device, this is rarely 
the case. While security is often a reactionary 
environment in practically every technological 
environment, security is rarely a design goal in the 
medical implants industry [9, 14]. Implementing 
adequate security begins during the foundational 
development phases when choices like which 
operating system to use are made [15].  There 
seemingly exists a gap in the security safeguards being 
implemented in the medical device industry and other 
industries with high-security levels already in place 
[16]. Given the importance of these devices, they are 
a logical target for cyberattacks. As the importance of 
these devices continues to rise, so will the level of 
threats against these devices. However, there seems to 
be an inverse relationship between threat levels and 
preventative measures. Hackers are seemingly 
outpacing manufacturers, leaving providers at a 
disadvantage concerning security vulnerabilities [17]. 
There are several challenges to securing medical 
implant devices. Synonymously with other IoT 
devices, medical implant devices have very little 
computing power and memory. These limitations 
severely hinder the ability of manufacturers to secure 
these devices [18]. The limitation on battery size also 
places constraints on security measures that can be 
implemented. Measures such as encryption are 
constrained because of the strain they will place on the 
battery [19]. This poses severe authentication 
challenges for manufacturers. Furthermore, while 
system updates are non-invasive, performing some 
secure system updates can be cumbersome. These 
updates often require patients to make appointments in 
order for implants to receive security updates [9].  
While medical implant manufacturers struggle to 
design devices hardened enough to prevent 
cyberattacks, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has failed to produce regulations regarding the 
safeguards such as security updates that need to be in 
place [20, 21]. Instead of regulations, the FDA has 
issued pre and post guidance that focuses more on 
labeling and documentation to inform patients of 
cybersecurity issues and encouraging manufacturers to 
address cybersecurity issues throughout the life of the 
product rather than on providing technological 
guidelines to address requirements [22, 23]. Questions 
also exist as to whether device manufacturers and 
cloud service providers who collect protected health 
information on their own and not as associated with 
entities that are covered by HIPAA are also covered 
by HIPAA [24]. 
 
2. Study Review Process 
  
The objective of this review attempts to survey and 
summarize the current threat and vulnerability 
landscape that is faced by health practitioners, medical 
organizations, and hospitals that use medical IoT 
devices and manage healthcare-related information on 
their networks, what academic research has been 
published, and what attention has been brought to the 
potential problem. The information from this work is 
derived from scientific databases and relevant industry 
documents and publications. The most appropriate 
documents related to medically implanted IoT devices 
were selected. Through dependable sources such as 
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Economics 
Engineers), Scopus, Sage Journals, Science Direct, the 
authors have access to a large number of academic 
articles as well as industry analysis. These databases 
were selected from technical and medical literature. 
The search was limited to peer reviewed journals and 
conference articles from the last five years. 
Publications such as books and book chapters were not 
given consideration. The author used the query 
“(‘internet of things’ OR ‘medical internet of things’) 
AND (‘security’ OR ‘privacy’) AND (‘healthcare’ OR 
‘mhealth’ OR ‘m-health’ OR ‘medicine’)”. The 
documents that were analyzed are detailed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Articles analyzed in this study 
Title Description of Contribution 
[25] The authors focus on a case example of an 
implanted medical device cybersecurity 
threat. The actions taken by stakeholders is 
outlined and a summary of the position of 
societies in response to the events is given. 
[26] A framework, based on international 
common criteria, for fostering security in 
wireless health devices. The authors aspire 
to provide a way forward that stimulates 
security, public trust, and confidence. 
[11] Explores the possible risks of hacking for 
patients using cardiac implant devices and 
outline what can be done by multiple 
stakeholders to improve cybersecurity. 
[13] This study seeks to determine whether or not 
it is feasible to hack NHS pacemakers. 
Experiments in this study were performed 
from the perspective of an average hacker, 
not of one with intimate knowledge of how 
to hack a pacemaker. 
[27] The authors seek to develop a new protocol 
to facilitate wireless communication 
between implantable medical devices and 
remote controls that are used to control 
minor day to day operations. 
[12] Investigates the role of IoT in healthcare by 
exploring security and vulnerability issues, 
attacks, and solutions. 
[28] Examines the challenges and requirements 
of designing authentication protocols to 
secure the wireless transmission of sensitive 
data from implantable medical devices. 
[29] Reviews the regulatory frameworks 
addressing medical devices in the US, 
Europe, Canada, and Taiwan. The work also 
examines the status of reaching a global 
consensus on regulating medical devices. 
[30] The goal of this work is to increase 
awareness related to the security of medical 
IoT devices by identifying exploits and 
evaluating their impacts against a 
pacemaker automatic remote monitoring 
system (PARMS). 
[31] Examines and summarizes the literature 
related to using IoT based principles in 
implantable medical devices. 
[32] This document assists scholars and 
practitioners in communicating the extent 
and scope of the risks of cybersecurity and 
in advancing education and research in the 
medical IoT field. 
[33] The authors analyze multiple scenarios in 
order to understand the actual consequences 
of IoT based healthcare applications. 
[34] This article discusses the background and 
issues of possible attack vectors that are 
likely to be hacked and provides protection 
strategies that can be implemented.  
[35] Illustrates the measures healthcare 
organizations can implement until FDA 
regulations are established to safeguard 
patient safety. 
[36] Addresses authentication limitations by 
proposing an energy-aware signature that is 
appropriate for embedded medical devices 
with limited resources. 
[37] Relevant information regarding the security 
of brain implants is addressed, several 
mechanisms that can be utilized by hackers 
to gain unauthorized access are identified, 
and limitations rooted in IoT devices are 
discussed. 
[38] Reviews the existing threats of 
cybersecurity risks in implantable medical 
devices and proposed technical solutions. 
[39] This review article focuses on the 
challenges, threats, and solutions related to 
privacy and safety matters related to 
implantable medical devices. 
[40] This work introduces the problems 
associated with designing implantable 
medical devices with cybersecurity as a 
significant part of the design goal. 
[41] Examines the cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
associated with implanted medical devices 
and argues they are a national security risk 
which needs a joint effort between the 
government and private sector to protect 
patient safety. 
[42] Implements a low cost, energy efficient IoT 
medical system. 
[43] Current implantable medical device 
vulnerabilities are discussed. Security tests 
and demonstrations completed by 
researchers are presented. 
 
 
3. Study results  
 
As healthcare continues to increasingly utilize 
digital communication measures such as the internet 
and wireless communication, it will increasingly 
become more and more susceptible to cyberattacks. 
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Risks to healthcare from unintentional threats have 
long been known, but more recently, risks from 
intentional threats have been confirmed [21]. Due to 
the nature of these devices, security issues should also 
be considered safety issues to patients. Implanted 
medical devices not only capture and transmit 
physiological data to medical decision-makers, but 
they also perform tasks designed to regulate organs. 
Implanted medical devices that have been 
compromised can cause harm to a patient or even 
perform actions that are potentially profound. 
 
3.1. Known cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
acknowledged by the governing authority 
 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
the federal agency that is responsible for protecting the 
public’s health. As related to this study, the FDA is 
tasked with ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security 
of medical devices used by patients. The FDA has 
acknowledged that while the digital communication 
features present in medical devices increase the ability 
of medical providers to treat their patients,  they also 
increase the risk of cybersecurity threats [22, 23]. As 
medical devices are being connected to the internet, 
medical facilities, and other medical devices, 
manufacturers must remain diligent about protecting 
their customer’s health. Manufacturers and healthcare 
providers must remain diligent about implementing 
the recommendations to remediate the vulnerabilities 
that have been reported by the FDA so that the safety 
of patients is ensured (Table 2). As of yet, the FDA is 
not aware of any patient injury or death that is 
associated with a medical implant device 
cybersecurity incident [25]. However, it has been 
noted that devices are not checked for tampering 
following the death of a patient [13] . 
 
  
Table 2. Known medical device cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability and Description 
Date 
Issued 
SweynTooth: Bluetooth Low Energy 
exploit to crash, deadlock, or bypass 
security on devices [44] 
3/3/2020 
URGENT/11: Allow an attacker to 
remotely take control of a medical 
device and change its function [45] 
10/1/2019 
Medtronic MiniMed: Potential 
cybersecurity risks in Medtronic 
MiniMed insulin pumps [46] 
6/27/2019 
3/21/2019 
Medtronic ICDs or CRT-D: 
Cybersecurity vulnerability in 
wireless technology used to 
communicate between Medtronic’s 
implantable cardiac devices and home 
monitors [47] 
St. Jude’s Medical implantable 
cardiac devices and Merlin@home 
Transmitter: these cardiac devices 
contain devices that are vulnerable to 
cybersecurity intrusions and exploits 
[48] 
1/9/2017 
Hospira infusion pump system: these 
systems that continuously deliver 
anesthetic or therapeutic drugs can be 
programmed remotely through a 
healthcare providers LAN [49] 
5/13/2015 
 
The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has release documentation 
designed to assist medical providers with securing 
their devices on an enterprise level network. SP 1800-
8 focuses on wireless infusion pumps and lists the 
multiple security guidelines designed to help secure 
these devices [50]. While written specifically for 
wireless infusion pumps, the guidelines are applicable 
throughout the entire medical implant device 
ecosystem. However, absent from the document are 
the specifications and security standards necessary to 
meet these security assurances.    
 
3.2. Medical Implantable Devices and 
Cyberattacks 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the medical implantable 
devices and cyberattacks landscape. The integration of 
IoT into healthcare has brought tremendous advances 
in patient treatment options. The interconnectivity of 
the devices provides for remote monitoring by 
healthcare providers and wireless communication. 
This interconnectivity also introduces a portal by 
which cyberattacks can occur. 
 
 
3.2.1. Cardiac devices 
 
One area that has seen a significant amount of 
research is that of implanted cardiac devices. Multiple 
cardiac device exploits are being researched: 
 
In battery drain attacks, attackers seek to suddenly 
deplete the battery of the implanted medical device 
[11, 25]. Researchers are currently working on 
implementing an energy-efficient, low power solution 
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for IoT ECG monitoring devices that don’t 
compromise performance [42]. Wirelessly recharging 
batteries have been proposed to alleviate the battery 
constraints, currently limiting security measures [40]. 
However, this is a novel idea that requires more 




Figure 2. Medical Implantable Devices and 
Cyberattack Landscape 
 
Attack Graph Modeling is an attack graph visualizing 
the cybersecurity risks of remote health monitoring 
systems communicating with implantable devices 
[30]. The experiment showed that pacemaker 
automatic remote monitoring systems are prone to 
cyberattacks and require security measures to protect 
the patient’s data.   
 
Only the communication module was affected by 
signal jamming. The device did not exhibit any strange 
behavior, but if jamming was performed during the 
update session, the update data could be corrupted 
[13]. 
 
Code injection attempts proved to be unsuccessful. 
This was attributed to the medical device utilizing 
some form of a checksum [13]. 
 
Replay attacks attempting to transfer a data packet 
from one pacemaker to another subsequently failed 
[13]. 
 
 Implantable medical devices like pacemakers not only 
send data but receive data also. This allows hackers to 
target these medical devices, leaving patients 






Brainjacking refers to the unsanctioned control of 
a medically implanted brain implant. There are 
multiple options for hackers implementing a 
brainjacking attack [37]: 
 
Blind attacks do not require the attacker to have any 
knowledge about the patient. Blind attacks include 
cessation of therapy, battery drainage, administering 
the overcharge of stimulation, and stealing patient data 
by eavesdropping. 
 
Targeted attacks require personal knowledge about the 
patient. Targeted attacks include the modification of 
stimulation, impeding motor function, inducing pain, 




3.2.3. Implantable mobile devices 
 
Zheng et al. found the following vulnerabilities in 
pacemakers, IMDs, and insulin pump systems [43]: 
 
Doctors can gain access to an implantable mobile 
device without being required to authenticate as long 
as they have the same manufacturer and are the same 
model as a device for which they have a programmer. 
 
Communication between the programmer and 
implantable mobile device is not encrypted or is 
encrypted with a static key. The information related to 
the static key is stored in the implantable mobile 
device and can be retrieved at the beginning of the 
session. 
 
Off the shelf programmers that can be used to access 
implantable mobile devices. 
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3.3. Security and attacks 
Figure 3 illustrates the security and attacks 
vulnerability landscape. Currently there are no 
standards governing security in medical devices. The 
current lack of security standards not only impacts 
patients but other stakeholders as well [13].  
Government regulations for security, such as HIPAA, 
the FDA, and NIST, offer guidance instead of actual 
regulations. Guidance instead of regulation can offer 
patients using devices that have the approval of these 
agencies a false sense of security [26]. Security 
standards should be created through collaborative 
work between experts from different fields that 
represent the stakeholders involved [31]. 
Recommendations from the private sector to realize a 
national security standard include a national system 
designed to share information related to medical 
device cybersecurity [41]. In order to understand the 
specific security requirements that are needed, a 
system-wide view of the security issues must be 
assessed [33]. The FDA has recently begun to initiate 
an action plan designed to move towards a more 
security-based approach to the design of medical 
devices [29, 35]. While these are not regulations, this 
is a step in the right direction. 
 
 
Figure 3. Vulnerability Landscape 
 
3.3.1. Security issues 
 
Multiple issues exist with medical devices. These 
devices are often omitted from routine scans for IT 
equipment, causing them to be omitted from software 
updates and patches. This exacerbates vulnerabilities 
on the medical facility’s network because of the 
difficulty patching [39]. 
 
3.3.2. Unpatched Devices 
 
When reviewing the high-profile St. Jude Medical 
(currently Abbott) case, Alexander et al. found that 
although the firmware update was non-invasive and 
was completed in approximately three minutes, the 
majority of patients with Abbott pacemakers elected 
not to receive the update designed to correct the known 
cybersecurity vulnerability [25]. Factors that may have 
led to a decreased update rate include possible 
complications resulting from the update and the life 
expectancy of the device. The FDA reported that of the 
devices were updated, 0.62% experienced issues with 
the update process that required resolving, and 0.14% 
of the patients experienced stimulations or discomfort 
during the update process. The age demographic that 
was more likely to update were younger males with 
relatively new pacemakers. The age of the pacemaker 
is a determining factor when deciding to complete 
firmware because the life expectancy of the device is 
five to ten years. Patients with older devices had 
smaller windows in which the vulnerabilities were a 
threat. Although the “crash attack” and “battery drain 
attack” were performed on Abbott’s pacemaker, these 
cybersecurity risks extend to other medical devices 
that connect to the internet to facilitate remote 
monitoring and programming. A study conducted by 
Jackson et al. [32] found there to be a breakdown 
between information about vulnerabilities being 
relayed to patients. A step towards securing devices 
and protecting patients is to overcome the culture of 





While the report detailing Abbott’s vulnerability 
lacked details, it did explicitly mention the use of 
unauthenticated wireless communication [34]. An 
analysis conducted by Challa et al. [28] found that for 
implantable medical devices to function properly, 
authentication protocols must be designed to be 
lightweight with minimum processing requirements. 
When analyzing the wireless communication scheme 
utilized between an implantable medical device and 
the remote control used for daily non-critical 
functions, Belkhoja et al. [27] realized the lack of 
proper authentication measures. An authentication 
protocol that relies on plain text messages was 
proposed in order to avoid high computational costs, 
such as those common with encryption. Ozmen et al. 
[36] proposed a low energy digital signature designed 
for authenticating implanted medical devices. By not 
using the ephemeral public key in Schnorr-type 
signatures, and instead using a constant-size public 
key, they were able to secure an 8-bit AVR 
microcontroller. The implementation of multi-factor 
authentication has also been proposed to alleviate 
implantable medical device security issues [38]. This 
is considered an easy implementation being that 
biometric information from the patient can be used. 
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4. Security Requirements Needed for 
Medical Implant Devices 
 
The dynamic access permissions needed in the 
implantable medical device ecosystem require security 
solutions to be scalable and robust. The integrity and 
confidentiality of patient data and patient safety lie at 
the core of the security requirements of medical 
implantable devices. Patient privacy and safety must 
be preserved while data transfers to medical personnel 
remain easy to manage [51]. Data transfers should be 
encrypted from end to end during the transfer of 
configurations, commands, and private health data 
[52].    
 
5. Future Research Directions 
 
Conflicting recommendations currently exist 
regarding updating medical implant devices. Factors 
such as the age of the patient are often considered 
when determining whether to recommend a firmware 
upgrade. While the FDA has taken a firm stance on 
firmware upgrades on some implantable devices, such 
as pacemakers, manufacturers are taking a more lax 
approach and recommend considering more patient 
specific details such as the age of the device, the level 
of dependence on the pacemaker, and patient 
preference be considered before mandating a firmware 
upgrade [25]. Governing agencies have directed 
manufacturers in the right direction, but they have 
failed to properly define the standards and goals 
required to ensure the level of assurance that should be 
maintained for such life sustaining devices.  
Also absent from the literature and governing 
agencies is a method by which to evaluate medical 
implantable devices. There is no certification in place 
to assure the safety of these devices. As a way forward, 
standards and certifications based on rigorous security 
testing will help establish and quantify the level of 
assurance required for these life saving devices. 
Given the push to allow patients to play a decisive 
role in the firmware update process, patient education 
is of the upmost importance. Patients need to be made 
aware of the security issues and threats associated with 
medical implant devices so they can make informed 
decisions and hopefully be more proactive in keeping 
devices updated and secure. With the lack of 
regulations in place, patients must be armed with the 
power to make better decisions concerning the 





In this paper we reviewed the current threat and 
vulnerability landscape being faced by stakeholders 
that use medical implant devices. Medical implant 
devices are revolutionizing healthcare. These devices 
allow for remote monitoring, and some administer 
therapy as needed. By using the Internet to facilitate 
communication between mIoT sensors and devices, 
medical practitioners are exposing their patients to 
vulnerabilities shared with IoT devices. The external 
communication used to control and receive data from 
these devices makes the medical implants vulnerable 
to cyberattacks.  
As a result, privacy and security vulnerabilities 
have surfaced as pronounced challenges for mIoT 
device. While the benefits of mIoT devices are 
bountiful, we have reached a pivotal moment where 
the continued use of these devices requires the 
remediation of security vulnerabilities. While 
guidance is being provided by government agencies 
such as the FDA, regulations formed by a joint effort 
between stakeholders is needed. While no patient 
injuries resulting from cyberattacks have been noted, 
the time to act is now while this is still the case.  
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